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38% of the EU´s budget is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Mindful of 
the enormous challenges of mass migration or the deteriorating security situation in 
and around the EU, at least a partial redirection of these funds is warranted.  
 
 
 
Preparations for setting up the EU´s new budget, 
the Multiannual Financial Framework for the 
years 2021 to 2027, have started. In the past 
negotiations among Member States on the 
budget were highly contentious and showed the 
deep divide between those members which 
receive more money out of the budget than they 
pay in, and the so-called net contributors.  
 
One does not have to be a genius to predict that 
the coming negotiations will be even more 
contentious for at least two reasons. First, with 
the United Kingdom exiting the EU, the second 
biggest net contributor in absolute terms after 
Germany will have left, tearing a hole of roughly 
€7 billion annually into the EU budget. Second, 
there will not only be less money available but 
heightened pressure to spend more money on 
the manifold new challenges confronting the EU. 
These challenges range from strengthening the 
euro area to digitalization and from mass 
migration to Islamist terrorism.  
 
Accordingly, the EU is faced with the question of 
whether it still can afford to dedicate more than a 
third of its budget to subsidizing farmers who 
have over the last 60 years become a highly 
competitive economic sector, or if there are 
strong arguments to reform the CAP and redirect 
parts of its funds to add European value to 
spending on foreign and security policy, 
development, research and not least on 
migration. 
 
The authors of this policy brief are 
Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, University of 
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Goals and performance 
Common Agricultural Policy spending primarily 
takes the form of direct payments to farmers in 
what is referred to as the ‘First Pillar’ of the CAP. 
Direct payments account for roughly 70% of total 
CAP spending and almost one-third of total 
European Union (EU) spending. Most of the 
remaining CAP spending (roughly 25%) falls 
under the ‘Second Pillar’ which is used to finance 
development measures in rural areas. 
 
Two main justifications are provided for direct 
payments today: income support and compen-
sation for non-market environmental services 
provided by farmers (so-called ‘greening’). 
However, the goals of the CAP in Article 39 
TFEU do not foresee any form of direct income 
payment to farmers. According to Article 39, one 
goal of the CAP (b) is “thus to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community”. 
However, the word “thus” clearly stipulates that 
this goal is to be reached by means of goal (a) 
“to increase agricultural productivity”.  
 
Even if income support were explicitly listed as a 
goal of the CAP in the TFEU, the CAP’s record in 
pursuit of this goal is poor. The goals of the CAP 
in the TFEU refer to “a fair standard of living”. 
Standards of living are not determined by income 
alone, but even if we accept the focus on 
income, the term “fair” suggests progressive 
redistribution that targets low-income farm 
households. However, the distribution of CAP 
direct payments is not at all progressive.  
 
One inherent problem of direct payments (apart 
from capitalization in land prices) is their low 
degree of precision. An efficient income 
protection system should concentrate support on 
those in need. In 2015 roughly 18% of the 
recipients of direct payments in the EU-28 
received 80% of the volume of these payments. 
Using Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
data, Matthews calculates that the 80% of the 
farms in the EU with the lowest incomes receive 
only roughly 25% of the direct payments. At the 
other end of the scale, the 750,000 farms in the 
highest income decile receive 55% of all direct 
payments, or roughly 15% of all EU spending. 
 
Policy makers and farm lobbyists often claim that 
direct payments account for a large share of farm 
incomes, and that any reduction in direct 
payments would thus cause severe hardship. 
These claims ignore the fact that many farm 
households earn not only farm income but also 
farm-related and off-farm income. The European 
Court of Auditors has repeatedly criticised the 
Commission for failing to compile comprehensive 
data on farm-related and off-farm income as a 
basis for targeting CAP support. If these data 
were available, they would reveal that the oft-
cited shares of direct payments in farm incomes 
systematically and often substantially over-
estimate the importance of income support 
provided by direct payments. In summary, direct 
payments provide poorly targeted and wasteful 
income support. 
 
Since 2015 30% of the direct payments have 
been linked to three greening criteria; crop 
diversification, ecological focus areas, and the 
maintenance of permanent grassland. If a farm 
does not fulfil the applicable greening criteria, its 
direct payments can be reduced. 
 
The consensus among experts is that greening is 
unlikely to produce substantial increases in the 
provision of environmental services by farmers. 
There is no evidence that greening will produce 
more environmental benefits per euro of 
spending than alternative environmental 
measures. This lack of environmental effect and 
efficiency is not surprising, because greening 
was not primarily designed to generate 
environmental benefits, but rather to shore up 
the justification for direct payments to farmers 
without disturbing the distribution of direct 
payments between and within member states. 
 
Opportunity costs 
The increasing European opportunity costs of 
current CAP spending are immense. Money 
spent on direct payments or rural development 
programs is unavailable for urgently needed 
alternative uses. Some examples clearly 
demonstrate that the weight of CAP in the 
budget is way out of proportion to its relative 
importance for the future of Europe. 
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40% of one annual CAP budget would have 
been sufficient to finance the full reception costs 
including the asylum processes for all of the 
refugees who entered the EU in the crisis year of 
2015. 15 to 20% of the annual CAP budget 
would be sufficient to compensate for the loss of 
the UK net contribution. 52% of the annual CAP 
budget would be sufficient to fully close the EU’s 
development aid spending gap to the UN 
spending target of 0.7%. 
 
The opportunity cost argument is crucial and 
could be powerful. Its power would be weakened 
if the budget constraint is softened. Early signals 
that European public goods are to be financed 
on top of the existing budget must be avoided.  
 
Future priorities 
The objectives of the CAP outlined in Art. 39 
TFEU appear outdated given the socio-economic 
situation of modern European agriculture. Policy 
makers increasingly refer to other objectives to 
legitimize this policy (e.g. food quality, cultural 
landscapes, animal welfare, provision of public 
goods, development of rural areas). Inflating 
objectives is a standard strategy to immunize a 
policy against a changing environment and/or an 
unconvincing performance.  
 
In recent years the Commission has used 
‘Consultations’ in which citizens, organisations 
and other stakeholders are invited to provide 
assessments of the CAP’s priorities and 
performance. The most recent example is the 
ongoing ‘Consultation on modernising and 
simplifying the Common Agricultural Policy’. This 
‘Consultation’ is a classic example of framing, 
whereby responses to questions are influenced 
by how they are posed. The results of the 
ongoing ‘Consultation’ are predictable and will be 
used by policy makers to claim a continued 
mandate for direct payments to provide income 
support subject to ‘greening’. 
 
The Treaties have been amended several times 
since 1957, but the goals of the CAP have been 
left untouched. Agriculture has changed over 
these six decades, as have society’s priorities 
and expectations. Nevertheless, if policy makers 
wish to pursue new goals that reflect these 
changes, they should first secure a formal 
mandate by revising the goals that are stated in 
the TFEU. Framed ‘Consultation’ is no substitute 
for constitutional legitimacy. 
 
In the meantime, in accordance with Article 39 of 
the TFEU, the CAP should foster agricultural 
productivity, also as a means of improving 
standards of living in agriculture. Research, 
education and technology transfer are important 
policy tools in this regard, as are measures to 
encourage early retirement and consolidation of 
land holdings in member states characterised by 
large numbers of small holdings and older 
farmers.  
 
Direct payments should be gradually and 
completely eliminated over the next 10 years up 
to the end of the 2021-2027 MFF. The schedule 
for eliminating direct payments should be clearly 
communicated and strictly adhered to, so that 
farmers can negotiate land leases and otherwise 
plan their farm operations accordingly.  
 
Assessing a system’s productivity means 
comparing its inputs with a comprehensive 
measure of its outputs, including its 
environmental effects. The productivity goal in 
Article 39 TFEU therefore provides a justification 
for agri-environmental policy measures aimed at 
increasing (reducing) the production of 
environmental goods (bads). However, these 
measures should aim at the production of 
measurable outputs that have been prioritised by 
experts. EU agri-environmental policy should 
focus on European environmental goods (and 
bads) such as climate change, transnational 
watersheds, and cross-border measures such as 
corridors that link protected areas.  
 
The Case for co-financing of CAP 
Farm interests will demand compensation for the 
phasing-out of direct payments. Co-financing 
these payments is an option that may be more 
acceptable to those interests than outright cuts. 
Co-financing would allow for a substantial 
reduction of CAP spending in the EU budget and 
shift parts of the financial burden to the national 
level. This is highly appropriate given that many 
of the arguments used to justify the CAP relate to 
local or national public goods.  
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Increasing the national financial burden of 
agricultural support would set an incentive for 
better voter information. This would initiate an 
overdue debate at the national level about the 
fairness of providing sector-specific income 
support.  
 
A frequently used but non-compelling counter-
argument against co-financing is that a 
“renationalization” of CAP would threaten to kick 
off a destructive race of national subsidies. This 
is a misunderstanding. Co-financing is merely a 
financing tool and does not imply any changes to 
the rules of the European agricultural market. 
Co-financed direct payments would have to 
remain de-coupled to ensure that the principle of 
market unity is maintained. 
 
Political-economic considerations 
Phasing out and/or substantially co-financing 
direct payments would lead to a substantial 
reduction in CAP expenditure. This would disturb 
the delicate balance of net contributions by 
member states to the EU budget. Resistance to 
such redistribution has protected the CAP in the 
past, restricting the politically feasible set of CAP 
reforms to those that largely preserve the 
balance of net contributions. 
 
Brexit provides an opportunity to free the CAP 
from this straightjacket of juste retour. 
Agricultural policy options should be debated and 
adopted based on their merits, and any 
remaining political needs for maintaining some 
pattern of net contributions by member states 
should be accomplished post-CAP reform by a 
system of fiscal transfers among member states. 
 
A second related straightjacket that should not 
constrain agricultural policy reform in the EU is 
the logic of ‘communicating pillars’, according to 
which money that is saved in the First Pillar must 
be shifted to the Second Pillar. There is no 
compelling reason why CAP reform should be 
restricted to zero-sum reallocations between the 
pillars. Scarce EU budget resources should be 
allocated across policy areas according to 
European value added. CAP reform might lead 
to increased spending in the Second Pillar, but 
only after existing measures in the Second Pillar 
have been rigorously evaluated against 
alternative priorities in pressing areas such as 
migration policy, securing European borders, 
European infrastructure, European defence, and 
European education and research. 
 
The current distribution of CAP net balances is 
such that today only a few Member States pay 
the price to the benefit of a majority of countries. 
For the reform inclination of the majority this is a 
bad result. Reform support is further weakened 
by Brexit. With the United Kingdom the most 
prominent and determined CAP critic is leaving 
the European Union.  
 
The introduction of co-decision in CAP legislation 
through the Lisbon Treaty has increased the 
powers of the European Parliament. Recent 
research indicates that farming interests are 
strongly represented in the Parliament, so that 
this has in fact strengthened the forces 
defending the status quo. 
 
Conclusions 
Intellectually, the “greening” and “income 
protection” narratives must be exposed for what 
they are: flawed and misused arguments. A new 
green or social disguise for anachronistic direct 
payments is no progress. The CAP needs to be 
re-conceived, not re-labeled. 
 
Left to their own devices, agricultural policy 
makers seldom propose progressive reforms. 
The reform trajectory launched by Ray 
MacSharry and continued by Franz Fischler was 
largely a product of external pressures, 
specifically the need to make the CAP 
compatible with the world trading system and to 
prepare the CAP for the Eastern expansion of 
the EU. Today the largest reform impulse should 
result from the existential crisis that currently 
confronts the EU and the urgent need to prove 
that EU membership does not only benefit 
special interests.  
 
Note 
The paper combines and highlights the 
arguments of two reflection papers written by the 
respective authors to prepare for an expert 
workshop “CAP and the next MFF” held in Berlin 
in the Federal Foreign Office on 30 March 2017.  
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The papers are available for download here: 
 
https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/the-
common-agricultural-policy-and-the-next-eu-
budget-1/ 
 
https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/the-
common-agricultural-policy-and-the-next-eu-
budget/ 
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